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INFO RUHST/USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA 154

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TOP SECRET SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 5070

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, NATO, SALT

SUBJ: SALT: NATO EXPERTS MEETING, SEPTEMBER 12

SALT

REF: (A) USNATO 2423 (B) USNATO 4958 (C) USNATO 5042

1. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING NAC SESSION, EARLE, ACCOMPANIED BY HENKIN (US), MET WITH ALLIED SALT EXPERTS, QUESTIONS CENTERED ON CRUISE MISSILE BANS AND ALSO POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS ON ALLIED DEFENSE CAUSED BY SUCH BANS IN CONJUNCTION WITH POSSIBLE NON-TRANSFER PROVISION, RELATIONSHIP OF NON-TRANSFER TO NON-CIRCUMVENTION, SLBM AND ICBM MIRV VERIFICATION, SCC UTILITY IN IMPLEMENTING SALT AGREEMENT, SS-X-20, AGREED BANS ON CERTAIN SYSTEMS, HEAVY ICBM AND HEAVY BOMBER DEFINITIONS, AND REDUCTIONS, EXPERTS WERE GIVEN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING ON NEW SOVIET ICBMS AND SS-X-20, FREQUENT SALT EXPERTS' MEETINGS WERE URGED, END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER OPENING THE SESSION AND WELCOMING EARLE, THE CHAIRMAN ASKED IF EARLE COULD READ AGAIN THE STATEMENT MADE BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON (REFTEL B), IN VIEW OF ITS NOT HAVING BEEN DISTRIBUTED YET TO EXPERTS. EARLE READ NAC STATEMENT, CHAIRMAN THEN CALLED FOR QUESTIONS.

3. THOMSON (UK) ASKED IF EARLE COULD COMMENT ON "PETRIGNANI GROUP" CHART OF US AND SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS (REFTEL A), CIRCULATED LAST MAY, LISTING HOW BOTH SIDES WOULD LIMIT THESE SYSTEMS, IF AT ALL, IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. EARLE READ AND COMMENTED ON THE CHART IN LIGHT OF CURRENT US AND SOVIET POSITIONS AT GENEVA, EITHER CONFIRMING OR CORRECTING THE ENTRIES.

4. WILLOT (BELGIUM) ASKED IF LAUNCHERS FOR CRUISE MISSILES OR ONLY CRUISE MISSILES USED FOR NUCLEAR ATTACK WOULD BE LIMITED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT IF CRUISE MISSILES OVER INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE WERE BANNED AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION WERE ACCEPTED, THE US WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO FURNISH LESSER-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES INCLUDING THEIR WARHEADS

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TO THE ALLIES, WOULD IT STILL BE POSSIBLE IN SUCH A CASE TO SUPPLY CRUISE MISSILES WITH CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS? EARLE REPLIED THAT THE QUESTION CONTAINED SEVERAL ASSUMPTIONS AND IT WOULD BE SPECULATIVE TO ATTEMPT TO REPLY.

5, WILLOT THEN ASKED IF IT IS THE CRUISE MISSILE IN A NUCLEAR ROLE OR IN A GENERAL ROLE THAT WOULD BE LIMITED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT? EARLE REPLIED THAT CURRENTLY THERE IS ONLY AGREEMENT TO BAN "LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES".

6, SHEARER (IS) NOTED THAT CERTAIN SOVIET LAUNCHERS ARE NOW ESTIMATED TO CONTAIN FOBS, HE ASKED IF THE BAN ON FOBS SYSTEMS WOULD EXTEND TO THESE LAUNCHERS, AS WELL AS THEIR MISSILES, OR IF THEY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO FREE. EARLE REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD INDEED TESTED FOBS, THAT THE LAST TEST HAD OCCURRED ABOUT FOUR YEARS AGO, AND THAT THEY MAY HAVE DEPLOYED SOME, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT CERTAIN, THE DELEGATIONS CURRENTLY WERE ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO DRAFT THE AGREEMENT AND DEAL WITH THE ISSUE SHEARER HAD POSED. IT APPEARS THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO REMOVE FOBS MISSILES BUT NOT, EARLE BELIEVED, THE SILOS. THEY WOULD, ON THE OTHER HAND, BAN THE CONVERSION OF OLD SILOS TO TYPES DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR SUCH A PURPOSE.

7, ROTH (FRG) ASKED IF THE US DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE SS-19 AS A THRESHOLD, EARLE REPLIED THAT US FORMULATION WAS IN TERMS OF VOLUME OR THROW-WEIGHT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE SS-19, ALTHOUGH THE PROVISION IN THE DRAFT TREATY DOES NOT SPECIFY THE SS-19 BY NAME.

8, ROTH ASKED IF THE US POSITION REMAINED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LIMIT ON THE THROW-WEIGHT OF MIRV MISSILES, PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE TO THE ABOVE DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM, EARLE REPLIED THAT THE SIDES HAD AGREED, BOTH IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT, THAT THE EXISTING NUMBER OF SOVIET HEAVY ICBMS, ABOUT 300, WOULD NOT BE INCREASED, AND THAT THEREFORE THE DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM DID PLACE SOME LIMITATION ON THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS, BOTH MIRVED AND NON-MIRVED.

9, THOMSON (UK) ASKED WHETHER EARLE COULD ESTIMATE HOW THE SOVIETS WOULD BE LIKELY TO CONFIGURE THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES IN THE 1977-85 TIME PERIOD. FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD THEY BUILD UP BEYOND THE 62 SUBMARINES ALLOWED THEM UNDER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OR REDUCE THEIR HEAVY BOMBER FORCE? EARLE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE GIVEN BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION AS TO THEIR

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FUTURE DEPLOYMENT PLANS, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS PROBABLY WOULD
DEPLOY ABOUT THE NUMBER OF SLBM LAUNCHERS ALLOWED THEM UNDER
THE IA. THE SOVIETS HAD VAGUELY REFERRED TO PLANS FOR A NEW
HEAVY BOMBER, BUT, GIVEN THE AGE OF THEIR BEARS AND BISON, THIS
WOULD BE NATURAL.

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10. DA RIN (ITALY) ASKED THREE QUESTIONS: (1) THE US AND SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO BAN SYSTEMS TO BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED, INCLUDING TERRITORIAL WATERS. DID THIS REPRESENT AN EXTENSION OF THE SEABED TREATY? (2) COULD MR. EARLE COMMENT AT ALL ON THE NEW SS-X-20, A SYSTEM OF GREAT INTEREST TO THE NATO ALLIANCE? (3) DID EARLE BELIEVE IN VIEW OF THE IMPASSE CURRENTLY OVER MAJOR ISSUES THAT THE TALKS WOULD NEED A MAJOR POLITICAL IMPULSE IN ORDER TO PROGRESS AT THIS TIME? EARLE REPLIED AS FOLLOWS: (1) THE SO-CALLED SEABED TREATY BANNED THE EMPLACEMENT OF CERTAIN SYSTEMS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. THE PROVISION OF THE DRAFT TREATY EXTENDED THIS BAN TO WATERS NOT COVERED IN THAT TREATY AND IN ADDITION BANNED THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AS WELL AS DEPLOYMENT, OF SUCH SYSTEMS. (2) WITH RESPECT TO DA RIN'S THIRD QUESTION, EARLE THOUGHT HE COULD ADD NOTHING USEFUL TO WHAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD SAID EARLIER ON THE SUBJECT OF UNRESOLVED MAJOR ISSUES (REFTEL C). (3) WITH REGARD TO THE SS-X-20 QUESTION, EARLE THOUGHT THAT THIS MIGHT BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO PRESENT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON A NUMBER OF SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS PROGRAMS, EARLE THEN DISTRIBUTED FIRING CHARTS SHOWING THE DATES OF TEST FIRINGS OF THE SS-16, 17, 18, AND 19, AS WELL AS THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT DATES OF THE SS-17, 18, AND 19, AND COMMENTED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE DEPLOYMENT LEVELS. HE WENT ON TO REVIEW THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW SOVIET ICBMS AND THE SS-X-20. EARLE, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM DA RIN ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE SS-X-20 ON THE EUROPEAN FORCE BALANCE, NOTED THAT THE MISSILE DID HAVE THREE RVs AND, BEING A NEWER AND MORE ADVANCED SYSTEM, WOULD PROBABLY HAVE GREATER ACCURACY THAN THE OLDER SOVIET MRBMS AND IRBMS. HOWEVER, SINCE HE THOUGHT THE SYSTEM WOULD BE A REPLACEMENT FOR THOSE OLDER MISSILES RATHER THAN AN ADDITION, IT WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE EUROPEAN BALANCE WOULD NOT CHANGE MATERIALLY. IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER QUESTION FROM DA RIN, EARLE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY SUBSTITUTE THE

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SS-X-20 FOR EXISTING IRBMS.

11. THOMSON (UK) NOTED THAT AT SOME POINT THE SOVIETS MIGHT ALSO REPLACE THEIR OLDER YANKEE-CLASS SLBMS WITH NEW ONES WHICH MIGHT BE MIRVED. SINCE THE NUMBER OF SILOS THAT COULD BE CONVERTED FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS17, 18, AND 19 ADDED TO THE NUMBER OF DELTA-CLASS SLBM LAUNCHERS APPROACHED 1320, THOMSON WAS CONCERNED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MIRV MISSILE FOR THE 500-600 SLBM LAUNCHERS ON THE 34 YANKEE-CLASS BOATS WOULD BE A HIGHLY DESTABILIZING MATTER. EARLE NOTED THE US POSITION THAT IF A MIRVED SLBM WERE DEPLOYED ON AN SSBN, THE US WOULD CONSIDER ALL LAUNCHERS ON ALL SSBNS IN THAT CLASS TO CONTAIN MIRVED SLBMS. HE ADDED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD NOT DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM EXTENSIVELY. THE FACT REMAINED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS HAD SAID WITH RESPECT TO MIRVED ICBM DEPLOYMENTS THAT THE US "WOULD BE ABLE TO KNOW" THE NUMBER OF SUCH SYSTEMS, BUT HAD NOT MADE SIMILAR CLAIMS IN THE CASE OF MIRVED SLBMS. THUS, THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND MIGHT QUITE LIKELY TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR PLANS FOR DEVELOPING MIRVED SLBMS, IF THEY PLANNED TO DEVELOP SUCH MISSILES.

12. WILLOT (BELGIUM) RECALLED THAT HE HAD HEARD OR READ THAT AT THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION OF COUNTING MIRVED ICBMS "BY SITE" ON THE BASIS OF ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT THAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED FOR THE MIRVED ICBMS. WAS THERE ANYTHING TO THIS RUMOR? EARLE REPLIED THAT HE COULDN'T ADD VERY MUCH TO WHAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD SAID (REFTEL C) REGARDING MIRV VERIFICATION. THE WHOLE ISSUE IS UNDER STUDY AND IS BEING DISCUSSED BILATERALLY. IN GENEVA, THE SOVIETS HAD NOT BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING AND HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE COUNTING RULES IN THE US PROTOCOL WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THEY ALSO ASSERTED THAT THE US IS TRYING TO OVERCOUNT THE NUMBER OF MIRVED MISSILES OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO IMPINGE ON THE SOVIET RIGHT TO STRUCTURE THEIR FORCES AS THEY WISH.

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EXDIS

13. THOMSON (UK) ASKED WHETHER IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET-PROPOSED STATEMENT ON FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS THAT THE US WERE TO MAKE UNILATERALLY, THERE WAS A CHANGE IN THE SOVIET PHILOSOPHY TOWARDS US UNILATERAL STATEMENTS AT SALT? EARLE REPLIED THAT THIS APPEARED MERELY TO INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT A UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY THE US WHEN IT WAS TO SOVIET ADVANTAGE.

14. SHEARER (IS) ASKED IF THE SOVIETS HAD TALKED AT ALL ABOUT THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO HAD JUST PROPOSED AT THE UNITED NATIONS. EARLE REPLIED NO.

15. WILLOT (BELGIUM) NOTED THAT THE BANS ON OUTER SPACE SYSTEMS REFERRED TO EARTH ORBIT ONLY AND WONDERED IF A BAN ON LUNAR ORBITING SYTEMS HAD BEEN LEFT OUT DELIVERATELY? EARLE RECALLED THAT THE OUTER SPACE TREATY BANNED PLACING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO OUTER SPACE. HE ADDED THAT THE BAN IN THE SALT DRAFT TEXT INCLUDED THE SYSTEMS FOR EMPLACING SUCH WEAPONS IN ORBIT AS WELL AS THE WEAPONS THEMSELVES. WILLOT REPLIED THAT, AS HE RECALLED, THE OUTER SPACE TREATY BANNED SUCH WEAPONS ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES, BUT NOT WEAPONS IN LUNAR ORBIT. EARLE SAID THIS WAS CONTRARY TO HIS RECOLLECTION, BUT HE WOULD CHECK.

16 THOMSON (UK), NOTING ON EARLE'S FIRING CHART THAT 12 SS18 FIRINGS HAD OCCURRED SINCE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT, ASKED HOW MANY OF THESE HAD INVOLVED MIRVS. EARLE REPLIED MOST HAD BEEN MIRV TESTS, WHICH INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE WORKING HARD TO PERFECT THE SYSTEM. WILLOT (BELGIUM) ASKED WHY THE SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE TO TEST THE SINGLE RV VERSION AT ALL IF IT WERE ALREADY DEPLOYED, TO WHICH EARLE REPLIED THAT EVIDENTLY THEY BELIEVE THE SYSTEM WAS NOT FULLY PERFECTED. THIS VIEW SEEMED TO BE CORROBORATED BY THE SLOW DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-18.

17. HOSTERT (LUXEMBOURG), NOTING AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S COMMENT (REFTEL C) THAT CURRENT SOVIET SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD CLAIMED WERE FOR TACTICAL USE AGAINST SHIPS, COULD BE USED TO STRIKE NEW YORK CITY, SUGGESTED

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THAT IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO RAISE FBS, THE US COULD COUNTER WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT. EARLE NOTED THAT THIS WAS A GOOD RIPOSTE AND THAT THERE WERE OTHERS, SUCH AS THE PROXIMITY OF ALASKA TO SOVIET FAR EASTERN FORCES. AS AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD SAID, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT DISCUSSING FBS NOW, SO THERE ARE NO RIPOSTES TO MAKE.

18. THOMSON (UK) ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY HINT THAT THE SOVIET NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION MIGHT EVENTUALLY INCLUDE NON-TRANSFER OR, ALTERNATIVELY, WHETHER NON-TRANSFER MIGHT ALSO SATISFY THEM WITH RESPECT TO NON-CIRCUMVENTION. EARLE SAID THAT, AS FOR NOW, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED NON-CIRCUMVENTION, IN ADDITION TO NON-TRANSFER, NOT AS A SUBSTITUTE. WILLOT (BELGIUM) OBSERVED THAT THE PHRASE "THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES" IN THE SOVIET NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION MUST BE A HINT THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO FALL OFF NON-TRANSFER, OTHERWISE, THE PHRASE WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED. EARLE REPLIED THAT "CIRCUMVENTION THROUGH A THIRD STATE" COULD INVOLVE US F-4S IN THE FRG AS WELL AS THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR ARMS TO THIRD STATES. THUS, IN HIS VIEW, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY AT THIS TIME WHETHER THE PHRASE WERE SUCH A HINT.

19. HOSTERT (LUXEMBOURG) SAID THAT HE HAD READ IN "NATO LITERATURE" THAT VARIOUS VERSIONS OF THE BACKFIRE HAD DIFFERENT RANGE PAYLOAD CAPABILITIES. HOW DID THE US COME TO ITS CONCLUSIONS AS STATED IN AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S ADDRESS REGARDING A SINGLE-RANGE PAYLOAD CAPABILITY FOR BACKFIRE? EARLE REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE LITERATURE TO WHICH HOSTERT REFERRED, BUT THAT THE FIGURES THE US HAD GIVEN TO THE SOVIETS REPRESENTED OUR CURRENT BEST ESTIMATES OF ITS CAPABILITIES. THESE ESTIMATES WERE CONTINUALLY IMPROVED, AND PERHAPS THE ESTIMATES HOSTERT HAD READ WERE BASED ON OLDER INFORMATION.

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20. VALLAUX (FRANCE) ASKED IF THE US WERE SURE, ASSUMING A PARTICULAR AIRCRAFT WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE, THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT EVADE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BY BUILDING A NEW VERSION THAT WAS SOMEWHAT LARGER AND MORE CAPABLE THAN THE ONE NOT INCLUDED. EARLE REPLIED THAT THE PROBLEM EXISTED HYPOTHETICALLY. NEVERTHELESS, IT SEEMD ADVISABLE TO SPECIFY BY NAME THE AIRCRAFT TO BE INCLUDED RATHER THAN SPECIFY A PARTICULAR PERFORMANCE CRITERION THAT WOULD CAUSE IT TO BE INCLUDED. IN THE LATTER CASE, THERE WOULD BE THE PROBLEM OF A SIDE DESIGNING AROUND THE LIMITATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IF TAKEOFF WEIGHT WERE THE CRITERION, AN AIRCRAFT COULD BE SPECIALLY DESIGNED WITH A WEIGHT ONE POUND LESS THAN THE THRESHOLD BUT WITH THE CAPABILITIES OF A HEAVY BOMBER. THE US COULD NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF ALL EVENTUALITIES, AND INDEED, THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE PROVISION IN THE SCC ARTICLE EMPOWERING THE SCC TO CONSIDER QUESTIONS OF COMPLIANCE AND RELATED QUESTIONS THAT MAY APPEAR AMBIGUOUS.

21. THOMSON (UK) EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT AGREE TO THE 600-KILOMETER LIMIT ON SEA-BASED AND AIR-BASED CRUISE MISSILES, IN VIEW OF SOVIET AIR DEFENSES. HE THEN ASKED THREE QUESTIONS: (1) DOES THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MINUTEMAN III AND MINUTEMAN II? (2) AMONG THE CRUCIAL ISSUES REMAINING, TO WHAT EXTENT IS EITHER SIDE MAKING LINKAGES? HE NOTED AS A POSSIBLE EXAMPLE THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD SAID LESS THAN WHAT THOMSON MIGHT HAVE GUESSED HE WOULD HAVE SAID WITH RESPECT TO LAND-BASED AND AIR-BASED MOBILE ICBMS. (3) DID EARLE GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT REDUCTIONS? EARLE REPLIED AS FOLLOWS: (1) THE SOVIETS TAKE THE POSITION THAT THEY CAN DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MINUTEMAN III AND MINUTEMAN II, WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR POSITION THAT NTM ARE SUFFICIENT FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES. (2) THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE ATTEMPT AT TRADING OFF IN THE NEGOTIATIONS EXCEPT IN MINOR MATTERS. AIR MOBILES AND LAND

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MIBILES, AS AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD SAID, ARE RELATED, BUT THE RELATIONSHIP HAS NOT BEEN ARTICULATED. (3) THE SOVIET UNION IS CURRENTLY RESISTING REDUCTION BY OCTOBER 3, 1977 TO THE AGREED 2400 LEVEL, AND HAVE PROPOSED THEY HAVE AN ADDITIONAL 12 MONTHS AFTER THAT DATE TO REACH IT. OUR POSITION IS THAT THEY MUST REDUCE TO THIS LEVEL BY THAT DATE. CLEARLY, 12 MONTHS IS FAR TOO LONG AN EXTENSION. THE SIDES ARE IN DISAGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. AS FOR FUTURE REDUCTIONS, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS AGREED IN THE PREAMBLE TO AN OBJECTIVE OF REDUCTIONS, NOT MERELY POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE FUTURE.

22. VALLAUX (FRANCE) NOTED THAT THE QUESTION OF AIR-LAUNCHED AND SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO EUROPE IN THE CONTEXT OF NON-TRANSFER AND ASKED IF THE UNITED STATES WERE AWARE OF THIS INTEREST. EARLE REPLIED THAT WE ARE.

23. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY HOSTERT (LUXEMBOURG), EARLE REPLIED THAT THE HEAVY MISSILE DEFINITION WAS IN TERMS OF THROW-WEIGHT OR VOLUME GREATER THAN THAT OF THE LARGEST NON-HEAVY MISSILE. ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT TAUTOLOGICAL, GIVEN THE SALT HISTORY AND NEGOTIATING RECORD, IT WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH SIDES.

24. WILLOT (BELIGUM) NOTED THAT IN THE AGGREGATE, HAVE THEY MENTIONED IT SINCE EARLE HAD LAST VISITED? EARLE REPLIED NO.

25. DA RI (ITALY), NOTING EUROPEAN INTEREST IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE AGREEMENT, ASKED IF THE SCC HAD PROVEN USEFUL IN IMPLEMENTING THE SALT ONE AGREEMENTS. EARLE REPLIED, THAT, AS AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD SAID (REFTEL C), THE SCC DISCUSSIONS WERE USEFUL AND BUSINESSLIKE. IN EARLE'S VIEW, THE PROCEDURES FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTROYING OLDER ICBM SITES NEGOTIATED IN THE SCC HAD BEEN DETAILED AND FORTHCOMING ON THE SOVIET PART. SO FAR AS THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE SCC IN THE FUTURE, THE PRINCIPAL SOVIET CONCERN APPEARS TO BE THAT PROCEDURES REGARDING THE REPLACEMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS AND THE CONVERSION OF EXISTING SYSTEMS COULD REPRESENT A US ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE SOVIET RATE OF CONVERSION FROM NON-MIRV MISSILE LAUNCHERS TO MIRV MISSILE LAUNCHERS. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE, THE US HAS REFINED ITS LANGUAGE TO EXCLUDE THIS INTERPRETATION. GIVEN THE SOVIET PENCHANT FOR SECRECY, THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION TO ANY EXTENT IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE MOVED TOWARD THE US POSITION ON

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THE SCC TERMS OF REFERENCE AND THEY MAY COME FARTHER, THEY
 APPEAR TO CONTINUE TO TAKE THE SCC QUITE SERIOUSLY.
 26. CHAIRMAN PABSCH TANKED MR. EARLE FOR HIS INFORMATIVE AND
 VERY USEFUL RESPONSES. IN LINE WITH ACTING NAC CHAIRMAN
 DE STAERKE'S REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR JOHNSON (REFTEL C), HE ADDED
 HIS HOPE THAT THERE WOULD BE FREQUENT EXPERTS' MEETINGS IN THE
 FUTURE. HE THEN CONCLUDED THE MEETING. BRUCE

T O P S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP80T00294A001200090019-3